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Sigmund Freud, faced with the coming to power of Hitler in 1933, the burning of
his books in Berlin, the 1938 Anschluss, followed by his exile to London for just
one year before he died, worked throughout the 1930s on his last controversial
thesis: the biblical Moses, the founder of the Jewish people, was actually an
Egyptian prince, he argued. Published in 1939, Moses and Monotheism, an
‘infamously unedited text’ (2018, p. 116), as one contributor to this volume
describes it, presents the quite unfounded hypothesis that, as a prince, Moses
served under the proto-monotheistic Egyptian pharaoh, Akhenaten. When the
latter’s regime fell, Moses joined the marginalized Israelite people and imposed
his proto-monotheistic views for creating what eventually would be known as the
Jewish people. In line with his earlier work Totem and Taboo, Freud suggested that
the new monotheistic religion was so prohibitive that the Israelite people decided
to murder their founding father, Moses, in order to allow themselves a more
permissive pleasure principle than the one that was offered to them by him. But a
period of ‘latency’ – so central to Freudian developmental theory – can also play
a role in the life of nations: the ‘returned of the repressed’, in the case of the people
of Israel, was the emergence of a new Moses, this time to impose monotheism
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for good. The triumph of monotheism not only ‘created’ the Jewish people but
also created what German Egyptologist Jan Assmann called the ‘mosaic
distinction’ – the transition from a ‘tolerable’ polytheism that characterized the
ancient world before Judaism, to the belief in one jealous God that represents one
truth. As mentioned, Freud’s hypothesis has almost never been accepted by any
serious scholar in the fields of Jewish history, biblical studies or Egyptology. Why,
then, has this text turned into a classic for scholars in all these disciplines? To
answer this and other related questions, the editors of this welcome volume bring
together some of the most senior scholars from relevant fields to discuss Freud’s
self-defined ‘historical novel’ for our time.
Is Moses really a ‘historical novel’? On the one hand, it is certainly not a novel
in the classic definition of the term (although as we shall see, commentators have
missed a lot here, as Yael Segalovitz argues in her very original reading of Moses
as a literary text rather than an unsuccessful scholarly work). On the other hand,
the historical thesis has been repeatedly refuted without much effort. Nevertheless,
Moses enjoyed much attention in the 1990s and early 2000s (Assmann, 1998;
Derrida, 1996; Said, 2004; Yerushalmi, 1991) which was part of a larger revival of
interest in Freud among Jewish studies scholars in the same period. For some
decades until the 1980s, historians of psychoanalysis were largely in agreement
that Freud was a ‘Godless Jew’. This was the title that Freud’s biographer,
Peter Gay, gave to one of his other books, in which he strongly advocated seeing
Freud as a man of the Enlightenment. However, historians like Yosef Hayim
Yerushalmi (1991), Sander Gilman (1991), Jay Geller (1993) and others were
part of a historiographical shift in which they insisted that we should not leave
unchallenged Freud’s self-perception as a ‘secular’ Jew. Freud represented –
sometimes against his will – a whole generation of urban Central European
assimilated Jewish intellectuals, who could not fully assimilate because of their
Jewishness. Defining them as ‘secular’ or ‘godless’ thus misses their identity
crisis – or their identity tragedy, one may say. Once the historiographical project
turned in the 1980s into exploring the traces of Freud’s Judaism, Moses became a
key text. What was more natural for historians desiring a better understanding of
Freud’s position on Judaism than reading Freud’s version – fictional or real – of
Moses (the Egyptian!)?
Freud, however, perceived monotheism not only as a religion that cannot be
attributed to a specific nation, culture or geographical area, but also as a
Weltanschauung – the one gate for understanding the Enlightenment and its core
values: secularism, science and progress. If one can replace many visible gods
with one invisible and abstract one, as Moses-the-Egyptian did, then one will be
able eventually to get rid of the idea of God altogether and replace it with a
civilization dominated by rationalism and scientific truth, so Freud wanted to
think. Hitler, Freud tried to argue, was not only an enemy of the Jews but the
enemy of the ‘modern’ as such.
But, as Edward Said (2004) reminded us in his reading of Freud, Moses was not
only the founding father of Judaism and monotheism; he was also ‘foreign’ to the
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Israelite people in the first place, and as such the Jewish people were constituted as
‘others’ from their very first moments. Freud perhaps wanted to celebrate the idea
that his own people are the authentic ‘modern’, but the simple fact that Moses was
a ‘non-European’ is much more significant than he, or many of his commentators,
predicted. Said’s seminal essay, Freud and the Non-European, aimed to challenge
the idea that Moses in the Freudian version is mainly an episode in the history of
European ideas. Some chapters in this volume suggest that scholars are still finding
Said’s suggestion to turn Freud’s legacy into an even more universalistic one
(namely global and non-European) a controversial proposition. Scholarly readings
of Moses are often dictated, including some in this volume, by a double act of
reading and dismissing the Freudian text at the same time. Scholars tend to begin
any textual analysis of Moses by discrediting Freud as an amateur reader of
historical texts and contextualizing it within other nineteenth-century and early
twentieth-century German intellectual traditions; but then, nevertheless, some still
claim the importance of Moses as an allegory of 1930s Europe that might be
relevant to other periods in history, including our own, although mainly, if not
only, in the Jewish context (i.e. for understanding anti-Semitism). The tension
between this line of reading Moses and a ‘Saidian’ one is very visible in this
volume in a way that makes it particularly interesting.
*
Assmann’s chapter is a tribute to Ernst Sellin, the biblical scholar who provided
Freud with the outline for his Moses. Assmann suggests that Sellin’s book, Mose
und seine Bedeutung für die israelitisch-jüdische Religionsgeschichte, published
in 1922, ‘deserves a better fate than surviving in a footnote of Freud’s book’
(p. 154). According to Assmann, Freud as well as Goethe – who was perhaps the
first to suggest, in 1819, that Moses was murdered by one of his own people,
namely Joshua – were not ‘careful readers of the bible’ and ‘neither of them was
interested in an exegesis of the biblical text’ (p. 154). It was only Sellin, he argues,
who had the right tools to identify the long-term tensions (‘murmurings’) between
the Israelites and their (new) God, as described in no fewer than 14 such incidents
in the Bible. Assmann convincingly shows how in this formative time, during the
establishment of a new religion and the creation of the Jewish people, there was no
need to think of one defining repressed trauma, as Freud did, because there were all
sorts of different traumatic events along the way from Egypt to the land of Israel.
The Israelites had trouble with the polarized framework that their monotheistic
God demanded. They found it hard to accept the new set of dichotomies of the
Mosaic distinction: ‘belief and disbelief, as Goethe had it, as well as loyalty and
betrayal, blessing and curse, love and wrath’ (p. 149). However, in the following
chapter, Ronald Hendel explains in much more detail why Sellin is still
remembered only with regard to Freud. His theory reflected ‘his predilection to
historicize Christian typology in his biblical exegesis’ and therefore ‘within
biblical scholarship, Sellin’s theory has been forgotten, for good reason’ (p. 164).
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When it comes to Freud’sMoses, it seems as though Assmann and Hendel are in
agreement that the Freudian ‘historical novel’ about Moses is a sort of
‘embarrassment’ that needs to be ‘corrected’, or even replaced by a more
‘worthy’ text, though it is still too important to be just ignored or allowed to fade
away into oblivion. But while Assmann suggests replacing Freud with better
readers of the biblical story, Hendel suggests replacing Moses himself with a
different biblical figure, that is, biblical Hosea. Hendel, like Assmann, claims that
although ‘Freud’s historical conjectures are unwarranted […] his psychological
categories may yet be fruitful for these issues if we reorient the analysis’. In fact,
he argues that ‘the subject should not be the historical Moses, to which we have
little or no access; instead, it should be Mosaic discourse to which we have ample
access’ (p. 171). The ‘Mosaic discourse’ is better represented, according to
Hendel, by the figure of Hosea, who ‘defines Israel as God’s chosen people’ and
by its ‘rejection’ of it which created also ‘Jewish Guilt’. This discourse of
‘chosenness’ has also been the source of anti-Semitic tropes in Jewish history ever
since, he claims. Hosea’s ‘Mosaic discourse’ – ‘trauma and guilt, memory and
anxiety, text and transgression’ – are all ‘exemplary Freudian themes’. What is
specifically Freudian in these themes Hendel does not say, but he credits Freud
with facing problems such as ‘how the Jews come to be what they are’, ‘why they
have attracted undying hatred’ and ‘a theory of religion’ – even if, he concludes,
the answers to these questions in Moses are ‘dubious’ (p. 173). But the questions
that Freud raised are not so original; it is precisely what Hendel calls Freud’s
‘dubious’ answers that has compelled scholars and commentators to read Moses
for more than 80 years now. It seems as if Hendel is either interested in the biblical
text, or in a psychoanalytic text that has yet to be written (e.g. ‘Hosea and
Monotheism’), rather than reading the Moses and Monotheism that Freud left
us with.
Willi Goetschel, in his chapter on Freud and Heine, is much closer to the
Freudian text. Like Assmann and Hendel, he begins by discrediting Moses as
‘a strange book, if we can, in fact, call this mix of uneven essayistic text a
book at all’ (p. 65), more of a ‘literary performance’ (p. 66). However, far
from dismissing Freud’s project altogether, Goetschel does acknowledge
Freud’s ‘alternative approach to history’ and his ‘[prime interest] in a history
of the psyche rather than in brute facts’ (p. 69). In terms of time and place,
however, Goetschel keeps locating Freud only within the discourse of
nineteenth-century German culture in a way that is historically justified and yet
limits the options of using this text for our times. Freud’s Moses, Goetschel
argues, contains a hidden Oedipal acknowledgement of – or perhaps what he
calls ‘wrestling’ with – Heine, rather than Moses: ‘the Moses that Freud
“inherited,” as it were, came not from the “Egyptians” but from a notion
of tradition that already viewed origins in a multiple, differential, and open
form – a belated, as it were, but deeply original truth’ (p. 82). In this reading,
Heine is the ‘real’ object of investigation for Freud, not Moses or the ‘Egyptians’–
as if the ingredients of this story that preoccupied modern German
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scholars has nothing to do with the ‘non-Europeans’ that did occupy
Freud’s ‘historical novel’.
A different, nuanced reading of the biblical story alongside the Freudian one is
given by Gilad Sharvit in his piece. Sharvit reveals an interesting blind spot in the
way Freud characterized Moses’s leadership. The biblical Moses, he argues,
was ‘defiant and strong-minded’ but not ‘domineering and controlling’, as Freud
portrayed him. While for Freud, Moses was an authoritarian great leader – the
ultimate father in the primal horde myth of Totem and Taboo – the biblical scene
of the Burning Bush (in which Moses was reluctant to heed God’s calling)
provides us with a totally different character of someone who is ready not to obey a
tyrannical God in order not to become a tyrannical leader himself. Or, in Sharvit’s
words, he insists on staying ‘outside God’s control’ (p. 208). Freud’s overlooking
of the Burning Bush scene might not be a coincidence, as this episode does not fit
the paternal figure that Freud saw in Moses. This in itself reveals the extent to
which Freud was loaded with fantasies about the possibility of a Jewish ‘strong
leader’, a figure not available in 1930s Europe when he was writing his book.
Several contributors pay attention to a well-known letter from Freud to Arnold
Zweig from 1934, where the former presents his Moses project – not yet fully
written yet already dogged by a real concern that it will be too controversial ever to
be published – as motivated by the question of ‘why [the Jew] has drawn upon
himself this undying hatred’ (Freud, 1992, p. 421). This question is quoted and
presented as a ‘smoking gun’ for Freud’s ‘real’ intellectual motivations in several
chapters of the book. For some contributors – but not all of them – it seems as
though Jew hatred, namely anti-Semitism, is the only possible relevance Moses
has for our own times. What else could qualify as the ‘return’ of our collective
‘repressed’? And yet, for the sake of not making historical errors or false
comparisons, we might want commentators to be more specific about the nature of
this ‘repressed’ and from whence it is ‘returned’?
For example, Richard J. Bernstein (the author of Freud and the Legacy of
Moses) finds this question about the sources of the ‘undying hatred’ for the Jews,
and Freud’s Moses as a whole, highly relevant for understanding ‘the recent
disturbing outbreaks of anti-Semitic incidents’ (p. 32). Freud provided us with a
legacy in which Moses was a prophet of progress which has been accompanied by
‘reactionary violence’ ever since (p. 40). Thus, the ‘outbreak of anti-Semitic
incidents today and the new forms of Jew hatred’ are also ‘an outbreak of the return
of the repressed’, Bernstein maintains (ibid.). However, while one can very clearly
make the case for anti-Semitism as the major form of reactionary violence in the
1930s – and without denying a major growth of anti-Semitic incidents in recent
years – it is unclear if today Jews are the one and only object of hate crimes and
racism. One may argue that racism is not a competition, and in fact outbursts of
racism against one minority group only inflame racism against others. But
Bernstein refers only to anti-Semitism and does not use at all the term ‘racism’,
as if Moses is a text only for and about the Jews and not applicable to any other
form of hate crime. Moreover, Bernstein overlooks current debates over how
SHAUL BAR-HAIM 375
to define anti-Semitism, where many historians argue that a wide definition is all
too often exploited to silence every criticism of the State of Israel.1
Bernstein argues that the ‘Jewish’ as presented by Freud in Moses is
‘epitomized’ by the title of the third section in Moses, ‘Der Fortschritt in der
Geistigkeit’, which was initially translated by Katherine Jones as ‘The Progress in
Spirituality’ and then by Strachey as ‘The Advance of Intellectuality’. But as Joel
Whitebook shows in his contribution, the concept of Geistigkeit cannot go
unchallenged. For Freud, Geistigkeit (in any of the translations) is related to the
ban on idolatry and the monotheistic dematerialization of God (rather than the
many materialized gods that existed before monotheism emerged as a new
organizing principle for religion). For Whitebook, ‘Geistigkeit is too uncritical and
affirmative – indeed, too unanalytic – and contains more than a whiff of
sanctimony and self-satisfaction’ (p. 55). Furthermore, in Freud’s writing,
Geistigkeit comes with ‘a denigration of maternal Sinnlichkeit’ in the false
dichotomy between masculine/paternal capacity for ‘conceptualization’ and
feminine/maternal inclination for the ‘sensual’. Whitebook claims that Moses
was Freud’s opportunity to show his commitment to ‘cosmopolitan and universal
values’ by refusing to ‘“put the truth aside in favour of what are supposed to be
[the] national interests” of his own people, regardless of the profound historical
crisis that was threatening them’ (p. 54; Whitebook quoting Freud, 1939, p. 7).
Paradoxically, turning Moses into an Egyptian, and turning monotheism into a
core value of enlightenedGeistigkeit, was a clear ‘national’ interest for Freud when
writing Moses, as that was a way to make the Nazi attack on the Jewish people in
Europe legible as a declaration of war against the Western values of progress as
such. For that purpose, Freud was ready to write a selective history of Akhenaten
that portrayed him – against some evidence for a more complex picture – as a
masculine ‘patriarch’, thereby endorsing masculine patriarchy as an element which
is part and parcel of Der Fortschritt in der Geistigkeit.
A different anti-nationalist reading of Moses is offered by Gabriele Schwab in
her thoughtful chapter. Freud was the first to admit how crucial the question of
‘belonging’ and ‘identity’ is to the story of Moses, but he himself also rejected
such a reading in the very first sentence of his book. In Schwab’s translation, Freud
states that ‘To deny a people the man whom it praises as the greatest of his sons is
nothing that one will like to do light-heartedly, especially when one belongs to this
very people’ (p. 102). Neither the otherness of Moses, nor the attempt at exploiting
1. As historian Daniel Blatman (2019) of the Hebrew University has written recently (in the
context of whether the Labour Party in the UK should or should not adopt the International
Holocaust Remembrance Alliance [IHRA] definition of anti-Semitism), ‘this is no longer
anti-Semitism that distinguishes between Jews and non-Jews based on criteria like religion,
culture, nationality or race – but one that makes a distinction between anti-Semites and
non-anti-Semites, based on criteria set by the Israeli government and by Jews and non-Jews who
support it’. See also Goldberg and Raz (2019). See also, however, a reply to criticism of the
IHRA by Yehuda Bauer (2019).
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the Exodus story for national purposes, were hidden from Freud. Acknowledging
the ‘non-European’ in Moses’s identity might be a starting point for assessing – as
well as criticizing – the colonial roots of Zionism (which does not imply
necessarily denying Zionism altogether). In Schwab’s words, ‘Said points to the
symbolic murder at the heart of official narratives of the Jewish state, namely, its
erasure of the non-Jewish heritage that Freud took such pains to expose’ (p. 95).
Schwab’s reading shows that ‘encrypted histories’ such as Moses are not that
interesting unless one is willing to take them seriously as a ‘psychic archive’ and
engage with the political questions such ‘archives’ may include.
In a different – but not unrelated – chapter on the ‘archaic heritage’ of Moses
and monotheism (with small ‘m’), Catherine Malabou suggests that Moses is not
only a text on the intergenerational transmission of the Jewish people but also a
prophetic text that provided an early hypothesis for what we would call today
‘epigenetics’, and what Freud called ‘phylogenesis’. One of the problems with
Moses – and Freud was the first to admit it – was that it is unclear whether
collective traumatic memory is inherited by biological or sociocultural forces.
Epigenetics could be the ‘space of biological negotiation’ (p. 192) that Freud so
much needed when he tried to answer the question of ‘how Jews have come to be
what they are’, because it explains history as designating ‘not only a series of past
events but also a specific type of biological inheritance’ (p. 193).2 Traumatic
events always leave epigenetic traces which inevitably will be transmitted to later
generations. The implication, however, is that there is not any traumatic event to
serve as an ‘origin’, and no primal scene that made it all possible or
inevitable – all ‘events’ are always already ‘epigenetic versions of the trauma’
(p. 195). Following Said, Malabou claims that there are no ‘privileged moments in
inheritance’ (p. 195). Thus, the Jewish people became what they are not only by
merging Moses I (the ‘Egyptian’) with Moses II (the ‘Medianite’), but also
through the appearance and disappearance of many other metaphorical Moseses
that kept, and still keep constituting the archaic heritage of the Jewish people.
Perhaps the most ambitious and interesting chapter of this volume is Yael
Segalovitz’s attempt to read Moses as a literary, and not necessarily historical, text.
She suggests replacing a ‘close reading’ of the Freudian text – which is what most
historians did – with a reading based on what Freud defined in 1912 as ‘evenly
suspended attention’ (Freud, 1912, p. 111). This is the only state of mind, Freud
claimed, by which the therapist can avoid being ‘selective’ in the materials
provided by the patient’s free association. The Freudian therapist ‘is asked to invest
all of his conscious energy in suppressing his “critical faculty” and its inclination
to “reject” certain materials’ (p. 115). Allowing such a critical suspension is what
characterized systems of belief. Indeed, Freud encouraged such forms of
2. Malabou defines ‘epigenetics’ as the field that ‘studies the mechanisms that modify the
function of genes by activating or deactivating them in the process of constituting the phenotype’
(p. 188).
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belief between the therapist and her patient, and Segalovitz makes the case for
extending this belief to Freud and his readers: ‘Freud’s Moses, a hunchback
wandering through history in its clumsy and peculiar ways, provokes its readers to
make their very act of reading an act of faith, to “take a plunge” into their internal
otherness and follow its lead’ (p. 130). Segalovitz’s Moses is a text that invites
‘an unselective, sensory-oriented reading’ which requires a ‘leap of faith’ by the
reader (p. 132). Faith is of course the major challenge of the monotheistic God.
It also a major theme that is still so fundamental to our lives today, more than
80 years after the publication of Freud’s extraordinary ‘historical novel’. Freud was
perhaps a ‘Godless Jew’, but not necessarily a faithless one.
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